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Published Books

  • Sebastián (2022) El problema de la consciencia. Una introducción crítica a la discusión filosófica actual. Madrid, Ediciones Cátedra. Teorema, Serie Mayor ISBN 978-84-376-4272-7

Published Papers 

  • Sebastián (2022) First-Person Perspective in Experience: Perspectival De Se Representation as an Explanation of the Delimitation Problem. Erkenntnis

  • Sebastián & Okón (2022) The Subjective-Objective Collapse Model: Virtues and Challenges in S. Gao (ed.) Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics. Oxford University Press

  • Sebastián (2021) First‐person representations and responsible agency in AI. Synthese.

  • Sebastián (2022) Being Self-Involved Without Thinking About It: Confusions, Virtues and Challenges of Higher-order Theories en J. Weisberg (ed.) Qualitative Consciousness: Themes from the Philosophy of David Rosenthal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  

  • Sebastián (2020b) Conciencia, primera persona y contenido no conceptual. En Pelaez, A. y Cervieri, I. (ed.) Contenido y fenomenología de la percepción. Aproximaciones filosóficas. Gedisa.


  • Sebastián (2020) Perspectival Self-Consciousness and Ego-Dissolution: an analysis of (some) altered states of consciousness. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1(I):9 (PDF) )


  • ​Sebastián (2019) Subjective Character, the Ego and De Se Representation: Phenomenological,   Metaphysical and Representational Considerations on Pre-reflective Self-awareness ProtoSociology 36: 12 (PDF)

  • ​Sebastián (2018b) Drop it like it’s HOT: a vicious regress for higher-order theories. Phil. Studies (PDF) DOI: 10.1007/s11098-018-1078-7

  • Sebastian (2017b) “Los sueños y el estudio científico de la consciencia” en Diaz, Jimenez and Mueller (eds.), La naturaleza de los sueños. Herder (PDF)

  • ​Sebastián (2017a) “Functions and mental representation: the theoretical role of representations and its real nature” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Science. 16(2):317-336. (PDF) DOI: 10.1007/s11097-015-9452-9

  • ​Sebastián (2016b) “Cognitive Access and Cognitive Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical  Issues". Philosophical Explorations 19(2): 188-204. Reprinted in Jorba, M. & Moran, D. (2018) Conscious Thinking and Cognitive Phenomenology. Routledge (ISBN: 978-0-8153-5907-4) (PDF)

  • ​Sebastián (2016a) “Consciousness and Theory of Mind: a common theory?” Theoria Volume 31, pp.73- 89. (PDF) DOI: 10.1387/theoria.14091

  • ​Sebastián & Okón (2016b) “Rejoinder to Filk” Mind and Matter Vol. 14(1), p.49 (PDF)

  • ​Sebastián (2015a) “What Panpsychists should reject. On the incompatibility of Panpsychism and  Organizational Invariantism”  Philosophical Studies, Volume 172, Issue 7, pp 1833-1846 (PDF)

  • ​Sebastián & Sanchez (2015) “Attention Alters Appearances and Solves the ’Many-Many Problem’:  Implications for Research in Skill Acquisition and Execution”. European Journal of Human Movement, Vol. 34:156-179. (PDF)

  • ​​Sebastián (2014a) “Dreams an Empirical way to settle the discussion between cognitive and non- cognitive theories of consciousness”. Synthese, Vol. 191, Issue 2: 263-285 (PDF)

  • ​Sebastián (2014c) “Not a HOT dream” In R. Brown (ed.). Consciousness Inside and Out:      Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Studies in Brain and Mind.          Springer Press. ISBN 978-94-007-6001-1 (PDF)

  • Sebastián (2008) “Are Factivity and Modal Closure a problem for Knowability?” in X. Arrazola, J.M. Larrazabal et al. (eds.), Logkca-07. Proceedings of the first ILCLI International Workshop on  Logic and Philosophy of Knowledge, Communication and Action. EHU-UPV. ISBN: 8498600227 ISBN-  13: 9788498600223​​

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