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Published Books​

• Sebastián (2022) El problema de la consciencia. Una introducción crítica a la discusión filosófica actual. Madrid, Ediciones Cátedra. Teorema, Serie Mayor ISBN 978-84-376-4272-7

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Published Papers 

• Sebastián (2024b) Consciousness and Perspectival De Se content. Synthese. DOI : 10.1007/s11229-024-04611-1

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• Sebastián & Martínez (2024) Gradualism, Bifurcation and Fading Qualia. Analysis, vol 84 (2):301-310

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• Sebastián (2024a) First-Person Perspective in Experience: Perspectival De Se Representation as an Explanation of the Delimitation Problem. Erkenntnis, vol. 89: pp.947-969

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• Sebastián & Atencia-Linares (2023b) Narrative Immersion as an Attentional Phenomenon. Inquiry

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• Sebastián & Atencia-Linares (2023a) Debates on Culinary Norms. The journal of Aesthetic and Art Critizism.

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• Sebastián & Escobedo (forthcoming) Reducción y emergencia en el contexto de la filosofía de la mente: fisicalismo y brecha explicativa. RHV: an International Journal of Philosophy

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• Sebastián (2023) El papel de las interacciones en la teoría de la mente. Diánoia, vol. 68, no. 90: pp. 121– 129

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• Sebastián & Atencia-Linares (2023) Understanding Perspectives: Phenomenal Content and the Uniqueness of Pespectives. Revista de la Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España. 67: 30-36.

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• Sebastián (2022d) Conscious Perception in favour of Essential Indexicality. Belgrade Philosophical Annual 35(2):13-30

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• Sebastián (2022c) Second-Person Attributions are Fundamentally First-Personal. Teorema. Vol. XLI/2: 31-48

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• Sebastián (2022b) First-Person Perspective in Experience: Perspectival De Se Representation as an Explanation of the Delimitation Problem. Erkenntnis

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• Sebastián & Okón (2022a) The Subjective-Objective Collapse Model: Virtues and Challenges in S. Gao (ed.) Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics. Oxford University Press

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• Sebastián (2021) First‐person representations and responsible agency in AI. Synthese.

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• Sebastián (2022) Being Self-Involved Without Thinking About It: Confusions, Virtues and Challenges of Higher-order Theories en J. Weisberg (ed.) Qualitative Consciousness: Themes from the Philosophy of David Rosenthal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  

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• Sebastián (2020b) Conciencia, primera persona y contenido no conceptual. En Pelaez, A. y Cervieri, I. (ed.) Contenido y fenomenología de la percepción. Aproximaciones filosóficas. Gedisa.

 

• Sebastián (2020) Perspectival Self-Consciousness and Ego-Dissolution: an analysis of (some) altered states of consciousness. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1(I):9 (PDF) https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.I.44 )

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• ​Sebastián (2019) Subjective Character, the Ego and De Se Representation: Phenomenological,   Metaphysical and Representational Considerations on Pre-reflective Self-awareness ProtoSociology 36: 12 (PDF) https://doi.org/10.5840/protosociology20193612

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• Sebastián & Okón (2018) A consciousness-based quantum objective collapse model. Synthese. (PDF) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1887-4 

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• Sebastián & Artiga (2018) Informational Theories of Content and Mental Representation. Review in Philosophy and Psychology. (PDF) ​https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-018-0408-1
   

• ​​​Sebastián (2018e) Embodied Appearance Properties and Subjectivity. Adaptative Behaviour. (PDF) https://doi.org/10.1177/1059712318768460

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• Sebastián (2018d) Teorías de la Consciencia. Enciclopedia SEFA de Filosofía Analítica. ISSN 2605- 5449 (PDF) http://www.sefaweb.es/teorias-de-la-consciencia/

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• ​​​​Sebastián (2018c) Consciencia. Enciclopedia. Enciclopedia SEFA de Filosofía Analítica. ISSN 2605- 5449 (PDF) http://www.sefaweb.es/consciencia/

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• ​Sebastián (2018b) Drop it like it’s HOT: a vicious regress for higher-order theories. Phil. Studies (PDF) DOI: 10.1007/s11098-018-1078-7

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• ​Sebastián (2018a) Access, Phenomenology and Sorites. Ratio (PDF)  https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12189

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• ​Sebastián & Artiga (2017) Can Informational Theories Account for Metarepresentation? (PDF) Topoi https://philarchive.org/archive/SEBCIT-3

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• ​Sebastián (2017d) “Hay muchas cosas que creo de mí mismo (consciente e inconscientemente) sin saber que las creo”. Crítica.Vol. 49(146):37 60 (PDF)  http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.180 

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• ​Sebastián (2017c) “On a confusion about which intuitions to trust: from the hard problem to a not easy one”. Topoi Vol.36(1), 31-40 (PDF)  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-015-9326-3

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• Sebastian (2017b) “Los sueños y el estudio científico de la consciencia” en Diaz, Jimenez and Mueller (eds.), La naturaleza de los sueños. Herder (PDF)

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• ​Sebastián (2017a) “Functions and mental representation: the theoretical role of representations and its real nature” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Science. 16(2):317-336. (PDF) DOI: 10.1007/s11097-015-9452-9

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• ​Sebastián (2016b) “Cognitive Access and Cognitive Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical  Issues". Philosophical Explorations 19(2): 188-204. Reprinted in Jorba, M. & Moran, D. (2018) Conscious Thinking and Cognitive Phenomenology. Routledge (ISBN: 978-0-8153-5907-4) (PDF)  https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2016.1176235

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• ​Sebastián (2016a) “Consciousness and Theory of Mind: a common theory?” Theoria Volume 31, pp.73- 89. (PDF) DOI: 10.1387/theoria.14091

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• Sebastián & Okón (2016a) “How to (Back Up or) Refute (certain) Quantum Theories of Consciousness” Mind and Matter Vol. 14(1), pp. 25–42 (PDF) http://www.filosoficas.unam.mx/~okon/english/quantumfinal.pdf

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• ​Sebastián & Okón (2016b) “Rejoinder to Filk” Mind and Matter Vol. 14(1), p.49 (PDF)

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• ​Sebastián (2015a) “What Panpsychists should reject. On the incompatibility of Panpsychism and  Organizational Invariantism”  Philosophical Studies, Volume 172, Issue 7, pp 1833-1846 (PDF) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0394-9

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• ​Sebastián (2015b) “Borderline experiences one cannot undergo” Crítica, Vol. 47, Issue 140: 31-42 (PDF) http://www.scielo.org.mx/pdf/rhfi/v47n140/0011-1503-rhfi-47-140-31.pdf

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• ​Sebastián & Sanchez (2015) “Attention Alters Appearances and Solves the ’Many-Many Problem’:  Implications for Research in Skill Acquisition and Execution”. European Journal of Human Movement, Vol. 34:156-179. (PDF)

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• ​​Sebastián (2014a) “Dreams an Empirical way to settle the discussion between cognitive and non- cognitive theories of consciousness”. Synthese, Vol. 191, Issue 2: 263-285 (PDF) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0385-y

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• ​Sebastián (2012/2014b) “Experiential Awareness: Do you Prefer It to Me?”  Philosophical Topics, Vol   40. N° 2: 155-177 (PDF)  https://philarchive.org/archive/SEBEAD-2

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• ​Sebastián (2014c) “Not a HOT dream” In R. Brown (ed.). Consciousness Inside and Out:      Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Studies in Brain and Mind.          Springer Press. ISBN 978-94-007-6001-1 (PDF)

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• Sebastián (2014d) “There is nothing HOT in our dreams: reply to Ivanowich and Weisberg” In R. Brown (ed.). Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Studies in Brain and Mind. Springer Press. (PDF) ISBN 978-94-007-6001-1 https://www.academia.edu/1963961/I_Cannot_Tell_You_Everything_About_my_Dreams_Reply_to_Ivanowich_and_Weisberg

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• Sebastián (2008) “Are Factivity and Modal Closure a problem for Knowability?” in X. Arrazola, J.M. Larrazabal et al. (eds.), Logkca-07. Proceedings of the first ILCLI International Workshop on  Logic and Philosophy of Knowledge, Communication and Action. EHU-UPV. ISBN: 8498600227 ISBN-  13: 9788498600223​​